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Abstract
The paper is an econometric study of the economic effects of corruption in African
countries. In economic literature, the mainstream view is that corruption is plainly
detrimental (the Sanding the Wheels Hypothesis, SWH). Still, efficient corruption
gains considerable support, too, particularly in the context of bad governance (the
Greasing the Wheels Hypothesis, GWH). In this paper, the effects of corruption on
Gross Domestic Product (GDP per capita) and investments (Investment to GDP
Ratio) are estimated with respect to several indicators that measure the quality of
governmental and social institutions. The paper finds substantial proof for GWH.
Corruption enhances economic growth in countries suffering from problems in public
management, business environment, infrastructure, or rural sector. Corruption fosters
investments in countries encountering shortcomings in terms of safety and legislation,
or political participation and human rights. Corruption has positive effects on both
growth and investments, if public health, social welfare, or education are flawed by bad
institutions. To sum up, while SWH holds in the big picture, GWH is also valid for
many African economies with depressing socioeconomic conditions. Therefore,
efforts should be put rather on reinforcing institutions than on plain battle against
corruption.
Keywords: Corruption, Growth, Institutions, Investments
JEL classification: D73
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1. Introduction
A common wisdom is that corruption must be fought out at all costs. This opinion is shared by
governments and non-governmental organizations, international institutions, media, the public,
politicians, and mainstream academics. Transparency International portrays corruption as “one of
the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It undermines good governance, systematically
distorts public policy, leads to a misallocation of public resources, deteriorates private and public
sector development and especially affects the poor”. This worldwide concern is highlighted for
example by the UN anti-corruption agreement in Mexico, 2003, ratified by 140 countries.
Nevertheless, corruption in all its forms is a resilient phenomenon that can still be found behind
many grave upheavals, such as the Arab Spring (Ramadan, 2012), or the European refugee tsunami
(UNCHR, 2015).
In terms of economics, the mainstream view is that corruption constitutes a serious impediment
to economic development. The seminal idea of Shleifer & Vishny (1993) is that corruption hampers
the economy because of its distortive effects on investments, particularly on foreign direct
investments. Mauro (1995), Mo (2001), and Méon & Sekkat (2005) confirm the idea that
investments, economic growth, and welfare are significantly reduced by corrupted bureaucracy.
The argument of Bliss & Di Tella (1997) is that corruption fosters monopolies, whose profits are
then drained by the bureaucrats. Myrdal (1968) and Kurer (1993) emphasize bureaucrats’ self-
interests in the creation of economic distortions, and Kaufmann et al. (2000) states that corruption
endogenously leads to poor governance and exacerbates the distortions.
Most of the economic literature clearly finds corruption indefensible, and the so-called ‘Sanding
the Wheels Hypothesis’ (SWH, Murphy et al., 1993) is certainly the prevalent idea. Popov (2015)
sums up the current view with noteworthy references to Mauro (1997), Ades & Di Tella (1999), La
Porta et al. (1999), Djankov et al. (2002), and Fan et al. (2009). In the light of this commonly shared
opinion, any economic reasoning in favour of corruption might sound provocative by questioning
the legitimacy of the worldwide combat against corruption.
Still, some early papers like Leff (1964) argue that corruption is an applicable tool, when the
bureaucracy is not functioning well enough. Méndez & Sepúlveda (2006) and Méon and Weill
(2008) also highlight the benefits of corruption in countries with deficient institutions and poor
governance. The theory of ‘efficient corruption’, or ‘Greasing the Wheels Hypothesis’ (GWH),
builds on the plain fact that governance is not always perfect. Huntington (1968) goes even further:
‘[…] in terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-centralized,
dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest bureaucracy’.
A moderate version of GWH is that while corruption impedes economic development in general,
it may still have some benefits in special cases of institutional malfunctioning. Organizational slack
is a typical malfunction. Leys (1965) and Lui (1985) argue that bribes may significantly cut the time
spent in queues and speed the process of sluggish administration thus reducing bureaucratic
inefficiency. By Bardhan (1997), in a second-best world with pre-existing distortions, additional
distortions caused by corruption may indeed improve welfare, and Aidt et al., (2008) states that
corruption may alleviate distortions and make the bureaucratic practices more efficient by making
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them more fluid, cutting red tape and bypassing rigid practices. Aidt (2009) concludes that
corruption has a considerable role in paving the firms’ way to the market.
Corruption is defended also by arguing that it has positive effects on the productivity of capital.
Leff (1964) claims that turning to corruption is associated with individual skills and talents with the
implication that licenses tend to be allocated to the most efficient firms. Beck & Maher (1986)
shows that, in a bribery game where licenses are illicitly issued to the firm bidding the highest bribe,
the lowest-cost firm always wins the game. Thus, corruption enables the imperfectly informed
bureaucrat to choose the best from potential investments with due effects on proper allocation of
capital. As Leff (1964) put it, ‘if the government erred in its decision, the course made possible by
corruption may well be the better one’. Yet, Svensson (2003) contradicts this idea by claiming that
corruption makes resources allocate to less profitable sectors with better reversibility of
investments.
Another excuse for corruption is that it may reduce risk it the economy, and less risk means more
investments (Bayley, 1966). By Nye (1967), corruption reduces risk by stabilizing social unrest,
because it eases citizens’ access to public services and cements their confidence in existing
institutions. Furthermore, Amundsen (1999) argues that, in new patrimonial political systems,
corruption can be used to hedge from the risk of expropriations or other unfair actions by the
government. The counterargument of Alesina & Angeletos (2005) is that corruption in fact distorts
redistributive policies thus provoking social unrest.
The above list of cons and pros of corruption is not at all exhaustive, but it suffices to illustrate the
controversial nature of the issue. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the controversy by taking
SWH and GWH under closer scrutiny. The hypotheses are tested against empirical data from 48
African countries. The presumption is that there are notable differences between African
economies with respect to both the existence of corruption and the quality of socioeconomic
conditions.  The research question is:  Does GWH get support from African data,  and if  it  does,
what are the crucial institutional aspects behind it? Section 2 of the paper describes the data and
the econometric models used in the study, and Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical
findings. Section 4 reports recursive tests on the validity of SWH and GWH and illustrates the
findings, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Data and modelling
The study is based on panel data of 48 African countries (listed in Appendix 1), and the time span
is from 2000 to 2013. The data includes real economic variables (from International Monetary
Fund, IMF, and World Bank, WB), corruption indices (from Transparency International, TI), and
a broad set of indicators of the quality of governmental and institutional aspects (from Ibrahim Mo
Foundation). Furthermore, ethnolinguistic fractionalization data by Roeder (2001) is used to test
the robustness of the empirical findings.1
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by TI is based on surveys and assessments conducted by
reliable institutions, and it has been in standard use in previous empirical studies (e.g. Mo, 2001;
Méon & Sekkat, 2005). The perceptive approach behind CPI is quite unavoidable, because
																																																								1	The test is similar to that in Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006, which is based on political instability variable.	
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corruption is a deliberately hidden action by definition. The original CPI indices vary from 0 to 10
with the lower bound indicating utmost corruption and the upper bound indicating full integrity.
For ease of interpretation, the indices are transformed by 11-CPI calculations to make CPI vary
between 1 and 11, where 1 means no corruption and 11 means utmost corruption.
The Ibrahim Mo Foundation indicators of the quality of governmental and socioeconomic
institutions (denoted GOV) correspond to the following quality categories: Safety and Rule of Law
(SRL), Participation and Human Rights (PHR), Sustainable Economic Opportunity (SEO), and
Human Development (HD). These four categories are constructed from 14 sub-categories
(described more closely in Appendix 2) as follows:
SRL = f (Rule of law; Accountability; Personal safety; National security)
PHR = f (Participation; Rights; Gender)
SEO = f (Public management; Business environment; Infrastructure; Rural Sector)
HD = f (Welfare; Education; Health).
The original quality indicators vary from 0 to 100 with quality improving upwards. Here, the
original indicator values are again transformed by subtracting them from 101 to make them vary
between 1 and 101 with quality decreasing upwards.
Two baseline models are constructed. The first model attempts to estimate the impact of
corruption on economic development by focusing on GDP per capita growth, and the second
model focuses on the impact of corruption on investments to GDP ratio, which should be a key
component of growth and development.2 Logarithmic  forms  of  variables  are  used  in  order  to
eliminate heteroscedasticity and asymmetry in residuals. The models read:
(1) ΔGi = γ0+γ1y0+ γ2ω+( γ3+ γ4GOV)CPI+ε,
(2) Ii/Gi = λ0+ λ1y0+ λ2ψ+( λ3+ λ4GOV)CPI+µ.
In equation (1), the dependent variable ΔGi = yt -  y0 stands for the variation of the purchasing-
power-parity corrected GDP per capita, with y0 symbolizing GDP per capita in the initial period
(year 2000). The superscript i refers to individual countries in the sample, γ:s are the coefficients to
be estimated, and ε is the error term.
On the right-hand side of equation (1), y0 appears to test the conditional convergence hypothesis.
Negative coefficient estimates (γ1<0) would say that poorer countries catch up the richer ones by
more rapid growth, facilitated by imitation of developed technologies, best business practices and
so on (Mankiw et al., 1992). ω is a vector of standard real economic variables contributing to
economic growth (Levine & Renelt, 1992). They include the following factors: physical capital,
reflected by investment to GDP ratio (denoted Investment, data from World Economic Outlook
Database, IMF); human capital, reflected by primary school completion (denoted Education, data
from World Development Indicator, WB); economic liberalism, reflected by the ratio of the
average values of total imports and exports to GDP (denoted Openness, data of exports and imports
																																																								2	The use of GDP growth and investments to GDP ratio data to trace economic development is reasonable because
of its good availability. However, a dismal fact is that both figures measure also inappropriate and inefficient elevations.
Other metrics, such as the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) might be better, but is has not been calculated for African
countries so far.
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from IMF); and population growth (denoted Population, data from IMF). The coefficient estimates
for all these variables should be positive (γ2>0) except that of Population, which should be negative
(γ2<0), when growth is monitored in per capita terms. The corruption variable CPI appears in two
interpretations. Negative coefficient estimates γ3<0 would say that corruption hampers growth
(SWH), while γ3>0 would claim the opposite (GWH). Moreover, since the multiplication of the
institutional indicators (GOV) with the corruption indices (CPI) implies the interaction of them,
positive coefficient estimates (γ4>0) would suggest further hampering of growth (SWH), while γ4<0
would claim the opposite (GWH).
In equation (2), the dependent variable Ii/Gi symbolizes the investment to GDP ratio. On the right-
hand side, λ:s stand for the coefficients to be estimated, µ is the error term, and y0 appears again as
a test of the conditional convergence hypothesis (with the expectation that λ1<0).  In accordance
with Levine et al. (1992), ψ is a vector of the real economic variables that determine investments.
They include Education, Openness, Exchange rate, and Gross saving.  The first  two are the same as in
equation (1). Likewise, the estimated coefficients of Education should be positive (λ2>0), because
the stock of human capital is supposed to attract investments (Levine et al., 1992; Benhabib &
Spiegel, 1994). Similarly, by Scully (2002), Openness should enhance investments by increasing
competition and the transfer of technologies and ideas, and by removing restraints and creating
new opportunities. Hence, the estimated coefficient should be positive (λ2>0).
The new variables, particularly important to investments, are Exchange rate (from WB) and Gross
saving (from IMF).  Exchange rate variation causes both positive and negative effects, and the sign
of the estimated coefficient depends on which of the two opposing effects dominates (Goldberg,
1993; Blonigen, 1997). Gross saving is  used  as  a  proxy  variable  for  the  main  financial  source  of
investments (cf. Levine et al., 1992, where the standard deviation of the growth rate of domestic
credit is used to assess the investment potential). Quite intuitively, the estimated coefficient should
be positive (λ2>0). Corruption (CPI) and the quality of institutions (GOV) appear again in the same
way than in equation (1). Therefore, coefficient estimates λ3<0 and λ4>0 would say that corruption
hampers investments the more the worse the institutions are (SWH), while estimates λ3>0 and λ4<0
would claim that corruption enhances investments the more the worse the institutions are (GWH).
 3. Empirical analysis
The estimations are based on Generalized Least Squares (GLS) estimators, which are sufficiently
robust to eliminate heteroscedasticity (ref. Méon & Sekkat, 2005). The estimations are conducted
in two specifications of the models (1) and (2). The preliminary specifications (denoted PM) do
not take into account the role of institutional quality that is the GOV variable (so that γ4=0), while
the full specifications include the potential implications of bad institutional arrangements described
in the previous section (that is γ4≠0).
3.1 The Growth model
The estimation results of the effects of corruption on per capita GDP growth, that is regressions
on equation (1), are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Estimation results of the effects on the variation of GDP per capita
PM EQ-1 & SRL EQ-1 & PHR EQ-1 & SEO EQ-1 & HD
EQ-1.0 EQ-1.1 EQ-1.2 EQ-1.3 EQ-1.4
Intercept -0.221**(0.08) -0.115(0.101) -0.195*(0.098) -0.422**(0.099) -0.341***(0.09)
y0 -7.6e-7(3.8e-6) -1.2e-6(3.8e-6) -4.3e-7(3.8e-6) -1.2e-6(3.5e-6) -7.4e-6.(4.0e-6)
Investment 0.056***(0.007) 0.056***(0.007) 0.056***(0.007) 0.055***(0.007) 0.052***(0.007)
Education 0.009(0.012) 0.007(0.012) 0.005(0.012) 0.001(0.011) -0.01(0.012)
Population 1.16***(0.103) 1.213***(1.037) 1.184***(0.102) 1.141***(0.099) 1.172***(0.101)
Openness 0.047**(0.015) 0.046**(0.015) 0.047**(0.015) 0.057***(0.014) 0.053***(0.014)
CPI -0.013**(0.004) -0.061(0.042) -0.025(0.04) 0.156**(0.053) 0.127**(0.048)
CPI SRL -0.027(0.025)
CPI PHR -0.048.(0.025)
CPI SEO -0.156***(0.04)
CPI HD -0.135***(0.03)
Adjusted-R2 0.355 0.363 0.360 0.382 0.3761
N 48 48 48 48 48
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression variables with superscripts “***”, “**”, “*”, “.” indicating
statistical significance at 0, 0.1, 1, 5, 10 % error level, respectively. GLS standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 1 shows that the basic economic variables used to explain growth fit the model, and their
coefficients stay stable over all regressions performed. The estimated signs of the intercept are
negative (γ0<0), and statistically significant, except with SRL (column EQ-1&SRL). The estimates
of the coefficients of initial income are also always negative, but not significant. Hence, the results
do not confirm the conditional convergence hypothesis (c.f. Mankiw et al., 1992), and catching-up
does not seem to prevail in Africa. The estimated coefficients of Education are mostly positive, but
very small and insignificant. Thus, changes in human capital doesn’t seem to have notable effects
on economic growth in Africa. In contrast, the results quite unambiguously show that physical
capital and trade liberalism constitute important factors of African growth. The estimated
coefficients for Investment and Openness are systematically positive (albeit relatively small) and
significant (ref. Levine et al., 1992; Scully, 2002). The positive, relatively big and highly significant
coefficient estimates of Population are somewhat surprising, because they contrast the expectation
of a negative effect. The main source of African growth still seems to be in the increase of unskilled
labour force.
In the preliminary specification (column PM, EQ-1.0), the coefficient of corruption is negative
(γ3<0) and significant, which means that corruption is harmful to economic growth. Literally, one-
unit increase in the standard deviation of CPI should  directly  cut  the  average  per  capita  GDP
growth rate by 0.013. Such results are in line with the mainstream idea that SWH is correct (Mauro,
1995; Mo, 2001.)3. Furthermore, even by controlling the dependent variable using either Investment
or Education, the impact of corruption on ΔGi remains unchanged, with γ3	always negative and
statistically significant. This suggests that beyond its negative impact on the accumulation of
production factors (capital and labor), corruption has also a direct effect on GDP per capita. Earlier
studies such as Mo (2001) and Méon & Sekkat (2005) take the same approach and find that, by
taking into account the accumulation of capital, corruption has a direct effect on the growth of real
GDP and the average growth rate of per capita income. On the contrary, Mauro (1995) does not
																																																								3	Méon & Sekkat, 2005 also finds a negative, but not significant correlation.	
*
*
*
*
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find a direct effect of corruption on per capita GDP growth by using Business International indices
for the corruption variable and investments as a control variable, and Mo (2001) does not support
such a correlation in the special case, where human capital is included in the regression. The direct
effect of corruption on economic growth might be reasoned by the relationship between
corruption and public investments, which are often singled out as corruption’s favorite playing
field (Tanzi et al., 1997). Another plausible explanation might be in incentives: Méon & Sekkat
(2005) contradicts Leff (1964) by claiming that corruption tends to distort the allocation of talents,
and favors less productive activities.
Turning to the full specification, the coefficients of corruption reflect the impact of corruption on
GDP per capita growth with reference to possible flaws in institutions. The estimations including
SRL and PHR do not lead to significant results. In both cases, neither corruption nor its interaction
with the two quality variables is significant in explaining the endogenous variable (regressions EQ-
1.1 and EQ-1.2). The Davidson-McKinnon J-test on EQ-1.0 against the alternative models EQ-
1.1, and EQ-1.2 validates the null hypothesis, with the implication that models EQ-1.1 and EQ-
1.2  can  be  rejected  in  favour  of  EQ-1.0.  As  a  result,  this  confirms  that  the  interaction  terms
including SRL or PHR do not bring statistically relevant information in explaining growth.
Therefore, the mechanical increase of the explanatory power (Adjusted-R2) of EQ-1.1 (0.363), and
EQ-1.2 (0.360) in comparison with EQ-1.0 (0.355) is somewhat counter-intuitive.4
On the other hand, when the focus is on SEO and HD (EQ-1.3 and EQ-1.4), the findings
unequivocally support GWH. In both cases the coefficient of corruption is positive and statistically
significant (γ3>0) meaning that, with flawed institutions in terms of SEO or HD, corruption turns
out to be clearly beneficial to GDP per capita growth (ref. Leff, 1964; Bardhan, 1997). In addition,
the coefficients of the interaction terms are negative (γ4<0) and voluminous, and highly significant.
This says that the positive impact of corruption on economic performance further increases, as the
institutional aspects deteriorate. This contradicts Méon & Sekkat (2005), but coheres with Méon
& Weill (2008), which also finds that the positive effect of corruption is strongly linked to the state
of institutions. In particular, the findings suggest that the marginal effect of corruption on growth
is beneficial in countries with deficient institutions or policies, while the effect is detrimental in
countries with solid institutions (ref. Méndez & Sepúlveda, 2006).5 Moreover, both the alternative
models EQ-1.3 and EQ-1.4 pass the J-test against EQ-1.0. This suggests that the inclusion of SEO
or HD in the regressions is statistically relevant, making the model perform better compared to the
preliminary specification (PM). The substantial increase in the adjusted-R2 accords with this
finding.
																																																								4	Méon & Sekkat (2005) uses governance variables by WB on a range of countries worldwide. Regression including
the quality of rule of law (“… reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as
well as the likelihood of crime and violence”, Kaufmann et al., 1999) concludes that corruption is pernicious to the
growth of per capita income in countries encountering this type of governance shortcomings. Yet, when the focus is
on the aspect of voice and accountability (“… reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media”,
ibid.), the findings are not meaningful.	5	With respect to Government effectiveness (“… reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality if policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies”, Kaufmann et al., 1999), Méon
& Sekkat (2005) rather supports SWH.
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To sum up the findings, SWH holds in the preliminary specification (EQ-1.0), where the
institutional quality of the sample economies is not considered. Taking the quality aspects into
account changes the picture. In particular, when the quality of SEO or HD (EQ-1.3 or EQ-1.4,
respectively) is considered, GWH is unambiguously validated. The robustness of the results is
tested by including additional variables among the regressors to see whether it statistically affects
the conclusions. The use of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index 1961, or 1985 explanatory
variable does not change the findings (see Appendix 4, which displays only results including the
ELF index 1961, since those with ELF 1985 are quite similar).
3.2 The Investment model
The estimation results of the effects of corruption on investments to GDP ratio, namely
regressions on equation (2), are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Estimation results of the effects on Investments to GDP ratio
PM EQ-2 & SRL EQ-2 & PHR EQ-2 & SEO EQ-2 & HD
EQ-2.0 EQ-2.1 EQ-2.2 EQ-2.3 EQ-2.4
Intercept 2.39***(0.353) 1.792***(0.334) 2.098***(0.339) 2.016***(0.342) 2.202***(0.326)
y0 9.6e-6(1.0e-5) 3.4e-6(9.6e-6) 1.08e-5(1.0e-5) 3.47e-6(1.0e-5) -1.35e-5(1.0e-5)
Education 0.044(0.035) 0.005(0.035) 0.001(0.035) -0.01(0.036) -0.115**(0.038)
Openness 0.132**(0.049) 0.126**(0.047) 0.134**(0.049) 0.144**(0.049) 0.158***(0.049)
Exchange rate 0.034*(0.013) 0.034**(0.012) 0.028*(0.013) 0.04**(0.013) 0.038**(0.012)
Gross saving 0.213***(0.013) 0.207***(0.013) 0.213***(0.013) 0.197***(0.013) 0.194***(0.012)
CPI -0.402**(0.118) 0.214.(0.126) -0.036(0.134) 0.11(0.154) 0.312*(0.134)
CPI SRL -0.127***(0.02)
CPI PHR -0.068***(0.02)
CPI SEO -0.112***(0.02)
CPI HD -0.197***(0.02)
Adjusted-R2 0.300 0.367 0.329 0.335 0.360
N 48 48 48 48 48
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression variables with superscripts “***”, “**”, “*”, “.” indicating
statistical significance at 0, 0.1, 1, 5, 10 % error level, respectively. GLS standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 2 shows that the predictors used to estimate equation (2) fit the model, and the results are
mainly as expected. The estimates of the intercept are now positive and highly significant over all
regressions (from EQ-2.0 to EQ-2.4). Initial income gets mostly positive but insignificant
coefficient estimates saying that no catching-up can be observed. Likewise, human capital does not
seem to attract investments, because the estimated coefficients of Education are mostly insignificant,
except that in regression EQ-2.4, where the coefficient quite surprisingly gets a negative and
significant estimate (c.f. Benhabib & Spiegel, 1994). On the other hand, international Openness
seems to have notable and statistically significant positive effects on investments, and Gross saving
has even clearer positive effects. Somewhat smaller, but significant positive effects on investments
come from the depreciation of domestic currency that is from the rise of the Exchange rate. (Ref.
Scully, 2002); Blonigen, 1997; and Levine et al., 1992.)
*
*
*
*
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In the preliminary modelling (EQ-2.0), it appears that corruption is inversely linked to investment
as well  as to GDP growth.  The estimated coefficient of corruption is  negative (λ3<0), relatively
voluminous, and statistically significant. To put it more precisely, one-unit increase in CPI standard
deviation in average would result in about 0.4 fall in the investment to GDP ratio. The finding is
in line with the SWH results by Shleifer & Vishny (1993), Tanzi et al. (1997), and Mauro (1995).
In the full specification, the coefficients of corruption turn more ambiguous. For example, the
estimates including PHR and SEO are insignificant even if the interaction variables associated with
them are negative and significant (EQ-2.2 and EQ-2.3)6. However, they nevertheless pass the J-
test against EQ-2.0. Considering SRL and HD, the coefficients of corruption are positive and
significant at 10 and 5 % level (EQ-2.1 and EQ-2.4, respectively), and the respective interaction
terms are negative and highly significant. Namely, λ3>0 says that, in countries whose institution
concerning SRL or HD are unsatisfactory, corruption has positive impacts on capital accumulation,
and λ4< 0 says that corruption becomes even more beneficial to capital investment as the
institutional quality gets poorer. This validates GWH in strict contrast with Méon & Sekkat (2005).
The J-test again verifies that the alternative specifications EQ-2.1 and EQ-2.4 perform better in
explaining investments compared to the preliminary specification EQ-2.0. This also is in line with
the higher explanatory power of the two specifications compared to the other ones.
To sum up, the estimations of the investment model (2) show that SWH is validated when the
focus is on the preliminary specification omitting the aspects of institutional quality (EQ-2.0).
However, the opposite claim GWH holds when the quality of SRL or HD is taken into account
(regressions EQ-2.1 and EQ-2.4, respectively). Moreover, when fractionalization indices are added
among predictors in the regressions, the findings remain unchanged (for the robustness check, see
Appendix 3).
4. Recursive tests
The synthesis of the results of the previous section is the following: If institutional quality is not
considered, corruption is in average detrimental to both growth and investments (that is SWH
holds). Taking the quality aspects under consideration, corruption not only turns beneficial to
growth in countries with poor SEO or HD and beneficial to investments in countries with poor
SRL or HD but also even more so, if the respective quality aspects get worse. This means that,
under these specified circumstances, GWH holds. The next step is to pinpoint the critical threshold
levels between poor and good institutional quality in order to derive notions about the scale of
possible attraction to corruption. This is done with reference to the average quality indicator values
presented in Appendix 1.
To seek for the critical thresholds, the sample countries are categorized from the lowest to the best
quality separately according to the transformed indicator values of SEO, SRL, and HD. Then, 15
sub-samples are constructed so that sub-sample number 1 includes the first 34 countries with the
lowest quality observations (that is biggest indicator values), sub-sample number 2 includes country
observations from the 2nd lowest to the 35th lowest, and so on. To test the growth model, equation
																																																								6	In Méon et al. (2005), the estimation including the aspect of voice and accountability, which seems closer to PHR,
also lead to inconclusive results.	
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(1) with γ4=0 is sequentially estimated using the sub-samples constructed against SEO and HD,
and the transformed CPI index values. The investment model is tested by estimating equation (2)
with λ4=0, and using SRL and HD related sub-samples. The average measures of SRL, SEO, and
HD in each sub-sample, and the corresponding CPI coefficient estimates are calculated for the
marginal effects of corruption on GDP per capita growth, and capital investments. The results are
discussed separately below.
4.1 The Growth model
Carrying out the estimation procedure described above for model (1) with respect to the average
values for SEO, and HD in each sub-sample yields corresponding estimates for the marginal effects
of corruption on GDP per capita growth. The results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Average institutional quality and the corresponding estimates of the effects of corruption
on GDP per capita growth (in parenthesis)
Sub-samples
Growth model
SEO HD
1 61.6 (0.0033) 51.94 (0.0171) *
2 60.8 (0.0016) 51.11 (0.0134).
3 60.01 (0.0025) 50.29 (-0.0056)
4 59.26 (0.0023) 49.64 (-1.59e-5)
5 58.5 (0.0060) 48.3 (-0.0098).
6 57.68 (0.0016) 48.14 (-0.0140) *
7 56.84 (-0.0283) *** 47.38 (-0.0128) *
8 55.97 (-0.0272) *** 46.56 (-0.0133) *
9 55.14 (-0.0328) *** 45.74 (-0.0097) *
10 54.34 (-0.0368) *** 44.85 (-0.0073)
11 53.59 (-0.0313) *** 43.89 (-0.0079).
12 52.67 (-0.0286) *** 42.9 (-0.012) **
13 51.77 (-0.0300) *** 41.86 (-0.0101) *
14 50.86 (-0.0304) *** 40.76 (-0.0084).
15 49.86 (-0.0279) *** 39.64 (-0.0008)
Inspection of Table 3 yields some support to the view that institutional quality matters to the effects
of corruption on GDP per capita growth, and thus to GWH. With respect to SEO, the effects are
positive (albeit very weak and statistically insignificant) up to the sub-sample number 7, after which
they turn negative and highly significant. With respect to HD, the first two sub-samples yield
positive and significant marginal effects, which turn significantly negative from sub-sample 5 on.
Figure 1 illustrates the findings.
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Figure 1: Effects of corruption on GDP per capita growth with respect to SEO and HD
In Figure 1, the horizontal axis depicts the deterioration of institutional quality, measured by the
average indicator values in each sub-sample of 34 countries (recall that the indicator values grow
as quality gets worse).  The CPI coefficient estimate values γ3 from each sample are depicted on the
vertical axis for the SEO and HD based estimations. The ordinate is at γ3=0, which is the threshold
that separates the validation of GWH (γ3>0) from that of SWH (γ3<0). The graphs connecting the
plots of the respective coefficient estimates in each sub-sample show that the impact of corruption
on growth is mainly negative for both SEO and HD. Both curves have an upward trend, and they
strike through the threshold line from below meaning that the marginal effect of corruption
diminishes and eventually gets more and more negative as institutional quality deteriorates. That
most of the plots lay on the negative area is in line with the estimation results of the preliminary
specification in Table 1 (regression EQ-1.0) saying that corruption is harmful to growth. However,
Figure  1 shows also that, in countries with the poorest levels of governance, corruption has a
positive impact on growth. This is in line with regressions EQ-1.3 and EQ-1.4 in Table 1.
Takin a closer look on the SEO related plots shows that positive effects of corruption on growth
appear within the first six sub-samples of lower institutional quality. The γ3 estimates are statistically
insignificant, but it may be due to the fact that these sub-portions together cover as many as 39 of
the 48 countries. Thus, the positive effects receive at least some appreciation. In sub-sample
number 6, the average of SEO measures is 57.68, and in sub-sample 7 it is 56.84. By Table 3, it is
quite  safe  to  set  the  critical  turning  point  from  GWH  to  SWH  roughly  at  60.  Comparison  to
Appendix 1 says that over one third of the sample countries are likely to find corruption feasible.
Similar assessment with respect to HD shows that only the first two coefficients of corruption are
clearly positive. They correspond to the two worst governance levels that is sub-samples number
1 and 2, which together cover 35 countries from the whole sample of 48 countries. The estimated
coefficients of corruption turn significantly negative in sub-sample 5, in which the average HD
measure is 48.3. By Table 3, the critical turning point from GWH to SWH could be roughly set at
50. Comparison of this threshold level to the average HD indicator values reported in Appendix 1
shows that, again, more than one third of the sample countries are likely to find corruption as an
acceptable tool in creating economic growth. Furthermore, GWH gets support from both HD and
SEO perspectives in about one fourth of all sample countries.
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4.2 The Investment model
The sequential estimation procedure for model (2) with respect to the average values for SRL, and
HD in each sub-sample yields corresponding estimates for the marginal effects of corruption on
the Investments to GDP ratio. The results are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Average institutional quality and the corresponding estimates of the effects of corruption
on investments (in parenthesis)
Sub-samples
Investment model
SRL HD
1 52.42 (-0.9894) *** 51.94 (-1.0285) ***
2 51.34 (-0.8242) *** 51.11 (-0.9500) ***
3 50.31 (-0.9226) *** 50.29 (-0.8150) ***
4 49.44 (-0.9986) *** 49.64 (-0.8730) ***
5 48.59 (-0.9964) *** 48.3 (-0.6820) ***
6 47.76 (-1.0649) *** 48.14 (-0.6300) ***
7 46.94 (-0.9775) *** 47.38 (-0.3570) **
8 46.14 (-0.7681) *** 46.56 (-0.3630) **
9 45.28 (-0.9939) *** 45.74 (-0.3340) **
10 44.44 (-0.9826) *** 44.85 (-0.2070) *
11 43.6 (-0.5814) *** 43.89 (-0.2180) *
12 42.65 (-0.4444) *** 42.9 (-0.2840) **
13 41.58 (-0.4917) *** 41.86 (-0.3530) ***
14 40.39 (-0.4739) *** 40.76 (-0.2970) **
15 39.24 (-0.4916) *** 39.64 (-0.2690) **
Table 4 shows that the recursive test on the effects of corruption on investments provides a
different result that that concerning the effects on growth. Now, the estimations based on sub-
samples constructed along SRL and HD provide systematically negative and statistically significant
corruption coefficients. Thus, the finding clearly supports SWH, and mirrors the estimation result
of the preliminary specification in Table 2 (EQ-2.0). This sounds striking, because the results of
Table 2, EQ-2.1 and EQ-2.4 meanwhile give unequivocal support to GWH. Therefore, the results
of this recursive test must be assessed closer.
A reasonable explanation to this puzzle is in the fact that the sub-sampling technique used above
in effect yields biased pools of low and high quality countries. This concerns especially sub-sample
number 1 with the lowest quality, since it includes as much as 34 of the 48 countries. It is quite
plausible that 71 % of the whole sample does not catch the idea of bad institutions properly. As a
matter of fact, the median indicator values of all the sub-samples are considerably smaller than the
respective average values saying that, in average terms, quite few countries with very high
institutional quality overwhelm a relatively big number of very low quality countries in all sub-
samples. However, using the median values in the regressions would be inconsistent, because the
estimates of the corruption coefficients reflect average values.
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To check this explanation, a progressive deterioration of institutional quality is simulated in order
to monitor the low quality end more accurately. This is done by narrowing sub-sample number 1
from below.  Dropping the countries with the lowest indicator values (that is the observations of
the highest quality in the sub-sample) for SRL and HD from sub-sample 1, respectively, and
carrying out the estimation	 of equation (2) with λ4=0 yields higher average values with
corresponding estimates for the corruption coefficients. Then, the next lowest observations (that
is the lowest that remain) are dropped, and the regression is carried out again. This progression is
continued until the number of country observations is reduced to 3 in the last regression. Table 5
shows the estimation results based on the progressively deteriorated quality indicator averages.
Table 5: Simulated impacts of corruption on investment according to SRL and HD
Number of
countries
SRL average
indices
HD average
indices
33 52.79 -1.006*** 52.26 -1.0074***
32 53.19 -0.8433*** 52.60 -0.8207***
31 53.60 -0.8235*** 52.94 -0.8003***
30 54.01 -0.8255*** 53.28 -1.2110***
29 54.43 -0.5111*** 53.60 -1.3097***
28 54.87 -1.0594*** 53.94 -1.3376***
27 55.30 -1.1655*** 54.28 -0.2093**
26 55.72 -1.4785*** 54.60 -1.2881***
25 56.15 -1.3404*** 54.93 -0.9587***
24 56.59 -0.71455*** 55.28 -0.5168***
23 57.05 -1.0233*** 55.62 -1.0722***
22 57.53 -1.0114*** 55.97 -1.4208***
21 58.04 -1.1381*** 56.31 -1.4934***
20 58.55 -1.1628*** 56.67 -1.6133***
19 59.09 -0.6349** 57.05 -2.096***
18 59.67 0.1783 57.47 -2.9854***
17 60.32 -0.00859 57.87 -2.6686***
16 61.00 -2.5742*** 58.24 -2.1234***
15 61.66 -1.8764*** 58.55 -2.248***
14 62.17 -1.4389*** 58.89 -2.2217***
13 62.73 -0.1857 59.25 -1.0769*
12 63.26 0.7345. 59.67 -1.0214*
11 63.88 0.0081 60.13 -1.7893**
10 64.42 1.3984*** 60.65 -2.6883***
9 65.06 1.9983*** 61.18 -3.8300***
8 65.86 0.3461** 61.80 -2.3842*
7 66.79 -0.4462 62.42 -4.4309**
6 67.58 -1.5273 63.22 -3.6192*
5 68.54 4.981*** 63.99 -0.6376
4 69.78 5.1794* 64.85 5.1387**
3 71.44 7.1334 66.28 10.4937
Table 5 shows that the effects of corruption stay persistently negative over the simulation rounds.
With respect to SRL, the effect turns significantly positive at 12 countries in the simulated sub-
sample, and with respect to HD, the same happens with only 4 countries. Thus, the message of
Table 5 must be taken with caution, because the number of country observations get very small in
the vicinity of the respective breaking points. In any case, the simulated effects of corruption on
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investments are positive, when institutional quality is very low, and that they turn negative, when
quality improves. With both SRL and HD, the critical threshold level is roughly 64, which says that
a couple of countries of the whole sample are in serious danger to find corruption beneficial for
capital accumulation (see Appendix 1, which tells that at least Central Africa and Chad clearly suffer
from insufficient institutional quality in both respects).
To sum up, the recursive tests verify the results of Table 2 saying that corruption enhances
investments in countries with poor institutional arrangements. Thus, GWH is supported. The
results of the tests also clarify the fact that, while GWH is unambiguously supported in the growth
model, the issue is notably more ambiguous in the investment model. This vindicates the
commonly made observation in the literature that there must be other channels for corruption to
affect growth than that through investments in physical capital (see e.g. Méon & Sekkat, 2005).
5. Conclusions
The paper tests the impacts of corruption on economic performance, namely on GDP per capita
growth and investments to GDP ratio. This theme is subject to a considerable debate in the
literature on corruption. Some authors suggest that corruption dampens economic growth and
investments (Sand the Wheels Hypothesis, SWH), while others claim the opposite, particularly
under institutional failures (Grease the Wheels Hypothesis, GWH). Using panel data of 48 African
countries, the paper intends to solve the SWH-GWH debate in this frame.
The paper finds that, if institutional quality is not taken into account, corruption reduces both
GDP  per  capita  growth  and  investment  to  GDP  ratio  in  African  economies.  In  particular,  the
negative correlation between corruption and economic growth prevails even if the latter is
controlled by physical investments, or human capital. This implies that, besides hampering these
production factors, corruption also has a direct effect on growth. In this preliminary setting, SWH
is thus validated.
The most noteworthy result of the paper is the verification of the link between socioeconomic
arrangements and corruption - the way that corruption influences economic performance is clearly
conditional on the quality of governance and institutions. In other words, considerable support for
GWH is found in those African countries that have major problems in this field.
Corruption is found to unequivocally foster economic growth in countries with flaws in Sustainable
economic opportunity (SEO), particularly in public administration. It is quite typical to many
African countries that bureaucracy is not only deficient but also overly heavy, and that corruption
tends to fatten it further. This has direct effects on GDP in the form of excessive salaries, pompous
administrative buildings and monuments, military bluster and so on. Excessive bureaucracy also
radiates  to  the  business  life,  where  bigger  firms  mimic  the  glory  of  the  ruling  elite,  and  where
corruption is a standard instrument to bypass queues, sluggishness and red tape. Integrated to this
system, smart firms find their ways, and growth emerges. Another explanation is the undeniable
need to build up physical infrastructure. Countries with high corruption often record massive
public investments, too, and a reasonable assumption is that corrupted bureaucrats tend to favor
them in order to get personal benefits. Allocating investments to public infrastructure at the
expense of private investments is a double-edged sword: it may distort the allocation of scarce
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resources,  but  it  also  creates  economic  growth,  whether  it  is  sound or  not.  After  all,  the  GDP
growth figures do not separate the inappropriate additions from the appropriate ones thus telling
very little about economic efficiency.
Furthermore, corruption has a clearly positive impact on physical investments in those countries
that have profound flaws in terms of Safety and rule of law (SRL). Low values of the SRL indicator
capture the absence of democracy, and lack of security, both of which are typical features of many
African countries and their neo-patrimonial political systems. In such non-democratic or semi-
democratic political regimes, power is exclusively concentrated to authoritarian groups that abuse
that power to extract collective wealth for their own purposes. This creates a deeply corrupted
wealth distribution system, where people at the lower levels also engage in corruption in order to
get their share, and to hedge against the ruling elite. As a result, there exists a seemingly stable
business environment that attracts investments.
Finally, corruption tends to boost both growth and investments in the context of deficient Human
development (HD). HD portrays  social  equity  in  terms  of  welfare,  education  and  health.  A
distinctive feature of western welfare state models is that there are powerful institutions to take
care of proper human development. This is reasoned not only by ethical and moral reasons but
very strongly so also by positive effects on economic performance. On the other end, a common
earmark of African countries is that such institutions are utterly deficient or totally absent, and that
informal systems, often involving corruption, take their place. Therefore, it is not a surprise that
the positive economic effects channel through corruption. The efficiency of such informal systems
compared to properly organized institutional, or welfare state type arrangements, remains an open
question.
To conclude, the paper hints that corruption may well be beneficial, if the quality of governance
and institutions is unsatisfactory. In this kind of a second best world, the distortive effects of
corruption in effect mitigate the more profound distortions caused by governmental and
institutional malfunctioning. In many African countries, the virtues of corruption are quite evident,
and its extermination is not an easy undertaking. The policy implication would then be that the
effort should be put rather on the reinforcement of institutions than on the plain fight against
corruption. However, implanting a western welfare state type socioeconomic model into African
cultural and mental soil would not be so easy either.
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Appendix 1. The 48 sample countries with average (over 2000-2013) indicator values for corruption
and institutional quality
Country CPI/SRL/
SEO/HD
Country CPI/SRL/
SEO/HD
Country CPI/SRL/
SEO/HD
Country CPI/SR/
SEO/HD
Algeria 8.107
51.1
50.75
29.73
Djibouti 8.129
46.53
54.91
47.49
Kenya 8.829
48.76
48.75
41.31
Rwanda 7.6
44.46
45.27
41.08
Angola 9.036
63.57
69.24
60.57
Dem.
Republic of
Congo
9.043
74.93
75.44
59.36
Lesotho 7.479
34.78
54.02
44.64
Sao Tome
and
Principe
8.179
35.31
60.01
41.39
Benin 7.964
36.61
52.54
49.04
Egypt 7.843
43.18
42.56
29.46
Madagascar 8.114
44.81
55.02
48.04
Senegal 7.736
40.45
48.29
44.06
Botswana 5.057
15.79
35.72
26.11
Equatorial
Guinea
9.2
59.37
72.64
45.99
Malawi 7.864
35.08
57.08
49.51
Seychelles 6.414
30.18
42.51
19.21
Burkina
Faso
7.643
37.96
51.14
54.58
Eritrea 8.393
62.79
72.93
54.94
Mali 8.071
41.96
53.82
52.05
Sierra
Leone
8.786
56.36
65.38
60.56
Burundi 8.9
58.68
67.12
55.91
Ethiopia 8.236
54.84
50.01
53.58
Mauritania 8.421
48.59
58.91
50.62
South of
Africa
6.393
30.19
34.78
23.2
Cameroon 8.764
54.49
58.21
46.57
Gabon 7.857
46.02
64.12
42.74
Mauritius 6.207
15.95
30.11
16.88
Swaziland 7.979
42.18
56.05
40.33
Cap Verde 6.043
20.17
43.76
21.13
Gambia 8.314
45.61
52.41
39.24
Morocco 7.436
40.07
42.17
34.37
Tanzania 8.157
40.29
48.37
46.3
Central
Africa
8.75
72.93
74.09
69.05
Ghana 6.921
30.15
48.64
33.56
Mozambique 8.314
41.06
55.81
53.78
Togo 8.5
47.83
74.1
54.28
Chad 9.307
64.79
70.88
68.22
Guinea 9.05
56.51
65.27
57.59
Namibia 6.314
25.92
41.82
35.95
Tunisia 6.443
35.89
34.47
16.01
Comoros 8.507
46.87
71.98
48.81
Guinea
Bissau
8.957
58.63
75.78
56.17
Niger 8.386
48.26
62.37
61.56
Uganda 8.529
49.42
50.4
42.05
Congo 8.814
62.03
67.2
54.09
Ivory Coast 8.707
66.47
58.72
57.52
Nigeria 8.979
58.45
63.08
49.47
Zambia 8.071
38.29
52.84
43.95
Note: Transformed indicators are used saying that, as the indicator values grow from 1, corruption and institutional quality
get worse.
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Appendix 2. Description of institutional indicators
SRL, Safety and rule of law = f (Rule of law; Accountability; Personal safety; National security)
· Rule of law = f (judicial process; judicial independence; sanctions; transfers of power;
property rights)
· Accountability = f (Accountability, transparency and corruption in the public sector;
Accountability, transparency and corruption in rural area; Bureaucracy and corruption;
Accountability of public officials; Corruption in government and public officials; Prosecution
of abuse of office; Diversion of public funds; Public sector corruption bodies; Access to
information)
· Personal safety = f (Political terror; Social unrest; Safety of the person; Police services; Violent
crime; Human trafficking)
· National security = f (Cross-border tensions; Government involvement in armed conflict;
Domestic armed conflict; Political refugees; Internally displaced people)
          PHR, Participation and human rights = f (Participation; Rights; Gender)
· Participation = f (Free and fair executive elections; Free and fair elections; Political
participation; Elective power to govern; Political rights)
· Rights = f (International human rights conventions; Human rights; Freedom of expression;
Freedom of association and assembly; Civil liberties)
· Gender = f (Gender equality; Gender balance in education; Women’s participation in the
labour force; Equal representation in rural areas; Women in parliament; Legislation on
violence against women; Gender equality in the workplace; Gender equality in appointments
into cabinet)
SEO, Sustainable economic opportunity = f (Public management; Business environment; Infrastructure;
       Rural sector)
· Public management = f (Statistical capacity; Public administration; Diversification; Reserve;
Budget management; Ratio of total revenue to total expenditure; Fiscal policy; Ratio of
external debt service to exports; Revenue collection; Access to financial records of state-
owned companies)
· Business environment = f (Competitive environment; Investment climate; Investment
climate for rural businesses; Rural financial services development; Bureaucracy and red tape;
Customs procedures; Soundness of banks)
· Infrastructure = f (Electricity supply; Road network; Rail network; Air transport; Telephone
and IT infrastructure; Digital connectivity; Access to water)
· Rural sector = f (Public resources for rural development; Land and water for low-income
rural populations; Agriculture research and extension services; Agriculture input and produce
markets; Policy and legal framework for rural organisations; Dialogue between government
and rural organisations; Agriculture policy costs)
HD, Human development = f (Welfare; Education; Health)
· Welfare = f (Welfare regime; Social protection and labour; Social exclusion; Welfare services
(Health and education); Equity of public resources use; Environmental policy;
Environmental sustainability)
· Education = f (Education provision and quality; Educational system quality; Ratio of pupils
to teachers in primary school; Tertiary enrolment; Literacy)
· Health = f (Maternal mortality; Child mortality; Immunisation (Measles; DPT and; Hepatitis
B); Antiretroviral treatment provision; Disease (Malaria and TB); Undernourishment; Access
to sanitation).
		 20
Appendix 3: Robustness check
Model (1):
PM EQ-1 & SRL EQ-1 & PHR EQ-1 & SEO EQ-1 & HD
EQ-1.0 EQ-1.1 EQ-1.2 EQ-1.3 EQ-1.4
Intercept -0.126(0.084) -0.035(0.10) -0.125(0.09) -0.257**(0.092) -0.229*(0.09)
y0 1.56e-6(4.38e-6) 5.07e-7(4.3e-6) 1.95e-6(4.33e-6) 2.28e-6(4.0e-6) -4.45e-6(4.3e-6)
Investment 0.048***(0.007) 0.049***(0.007) 0.047***(0.007) 0.048***(0.006) 0.043***(0.007)
Education -0.0019(0.012) -1.54e-3(0.012) -0.004(0.012) -0.006(0.011) -0.025*(0.012)
Population 1.18***(0.10) 1.22***(0.104) 1.20***(0.10) 1.16***(0.10) 1.21***(0.107)
Openness 0.032*(0.015) 0.031.(0.016) 0.035*(0.015) 0.039**(0.014) 0.035*(0.015)
Elf61 -0.005(0.02) -0.007(0.02) -0.011(0.02) -2.19e-7(0.018) 0.002(0.019)
CPI -0.01**(0.003) -0.08*(0.038) -0.021(0.034) 0.093*(0.044) 0.14***(0.043)
CPI SRL -0.009(0.02)
CPI PHR -0.03(0.023)
CPI SEO -0.103**(0.033)
CPI HD -0.145***(0.033)
Adjusted-R2 0.3491 0.3558 0.3550 0.3655 0.3765
N 48 48 48 48 48
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression variables with superscripts “***”, “**”, “*”, “.” indicating statistical
significance at 0, 0.1, 1, 5, 10 % error level, respectively. GLS standard deviations are in parentheses.
Model (2):
PM EQ-2 & SRL EQ-2 & PHR EQ-2 & SEO EQ-2 & HD
EQ-2.0 EQ-2.1 EQ-2.2 EQ-2.3 EQ-2.4
Intercept 2.57***(0.34) 2.095***(0.307) 2.174***(0.32) 2.20***(0.334) 2.443***(0.311)
y0 9.39e-6(1.03e-5) 5.82e-6(1.01e-5) 1.66e-5(1.05e-5) 5.59e-6(1.03e-5) -1.31e-5(1.07e-5)
Education 0.005(0.035) -0.052(0.032) -0.039(0.034) -0.038(0.035) -0.131***(0.035)
Openness 0.117*(0.049) 0.107*(0.044) 0.128**(0.048) -0.126**(0.048) 0.135**(0.047)
Exchange rate 0.012(0.011) 0.021.(0.011) 0.014(0.011) 0.022.(0.011) 0.027*(0.011)
Gross saving 0.19***(0.012) 0.204***(0.012) 0.20***(0.012) 0.18***(0.012) 0.182***(0.012)
Elf61 0.033(0.05) 0.025(0.049) 0.012(0.051) 0.014(0.05) 0.055(0.051)
CPI -0.307**(0.104) 0.231*(0.098) 0.063(0.109) 0.112(0.137) 0.324**(0.109)
CPI SRL -0.119***(0.018)
CPI PHR -0.071**(0.018)
CPI SEO -0.089***(0.026)
CPI HD -0.197***(0.026)
Adjusted-R2 0.2593 0.3121 0.2857 0.2922 0.3076
N 48 48 48 48 48
Note: The table reports the estimated coefficients of the regression variables with superscripts “***”, “**”, “*”, “.” indicating statistical
significance at 0, 0.1, 1, 5, 10 % error level, respectively. GLS standard deviations are in parentheses.
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